World roundup: February 15 2024
Stories from Israel-Palestine, Pakistan, Senegal, and elsewhere
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PROGRAMMING NOTE: As I mentioned in Friday’s roundup I will be taking a short break from the newsletter this weekend, which includes Monday’s Presidents’ Day holiday in the US. We will return to our regular schedule on Tuesday. Thanks for reading!
TODAY IN HISTORY
February 15, 1942: The World War II Battle of Singapore ends with the Japanese conquest of the British colony. Virtually the entire 85,000-man British force defending Singapore was lost—5000 killed or wounded and the remaining 80,000 captured. It was one of the largest surrenders in British military history and interestingly was not celebrated by Japan’s Nazi allies. Adolf Hitler apparently saw the Japanese victory as a defeat for white people the world over, and ordered Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop not to send congratulations to Tokyo.
February 15, 1989: Soviet forces complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan. This date has been annually commemorated in Afghanistan as “Liberation Day.”
MIDDLE EAST
ISRAEL-PALESTINE
Thousands of Palestinians are reportedly streaming out of Rafah ahead of an expected Israeli military (IDF) assault on that southern Gaza city. Absent a real evacuation plan—Benjamin Netanyahu’s “order” to produce one notwithstanding—the United Nations says most people are moving north to Deir al-Balah and other parts of central Gaza. They may be marginally safer there but they’ll also likely be cut off from the meager amount of humanitarian aid that’s trickling into the territory despite the best efforts of the Israeli government and affiliated protesters to block it. In Khan Younis, meanwhile, the IDF finally sent its soldiers into Nasser hospital on Thursday, one day after they ordered the evacuation of that facility. Despite that order hundreds of people are still believed to be in the hospital, including immovable patients, medical staff, and many who have been unable to leave because of IDF shelling outside. The IDF claims it has information that Hamas has been keeping hostages in the hospital.
Elsewhere:
While lamenting the Israeli government’s lack of “good options” for a Rafah assault—apparently “don’t do it” is not an option—The Washington Post has confirmed that the Egyptian government is preparing some sort of holding area along the Gaza border to accommodate Palestinian refugees. There is still no indication that Egyptian authorities are about to throw open the gates voluntarily, however. Rather it looks like they’re preparing for those gates to be overwhelmed by fleeing Palestinians once the IDF attack begins in earnest.
The South African government has gone back to the International Court of Justice, asking for the court to determine whether the eventual Rafah assault would violate the preliminary ruling the ICJ handed down last month ordering the Israeli government to avoid actions that might violate the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Israeli government has already responded, accusing South Africa of trying to help Hamas. Israel has effectively ignored last month’s ICJ ruling and would undoubtedly do so if it issues another ruling on Rafah.
The Post reported on Wednesday evening that “the Biden administration and a small group of Middle East partners” have been discussing Palestinian statehood as the key element in “a detailed, comprehensive plan for long-term peace between Israel and Palestinians.” That plan would be rolled out alongside the six-week ceasefire that the administration is still trying to mediate. Now, the vaunted “two-state solution” has long been the Middle Eastern version of Lucy pulling the football away from Charlie Brown (ask your parents). The US has floated big plans for establishing a Palestinian state many times only to allow them to wither on the proverbial vine. But this plan could include official and early recognition of a Palestinian state by the US government and others (UK Foreign Minister David Cameron has been floating this idea for some time now), which would definitely go beyond any of those past efforts. Needless to say that’s extremely unlikely, and even if it happened there’s no reason to believe the Israeli government (the current one or any that’s likely to come after it) would acquiesce.
Indeed, the Israeli government just unveiled a new $19 million dollar program to offer financial enticement for Israelis to relocate to frontier communities in northern and southern Israel as well as to West Bank settlements. Under any conceivable two-state solution Israel would have to roll back West Bank settlements, not expand them. Seems like a bit of a disconnect.
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 99 reporters were killed around the world in 2023, 77 of them in Gaza. I don’t really have anything to add to this, except to note the deafening silence on this story from Western media outlets. Israeli officials waver between insisting that they’re not deliberately targeting journalists and accusing the journalists they kill of working for Hamas and at some point you’d think that reporters in the West would object both to the accusations and to the killing of their colleagues. But then I suspect that most prominent Western journalists don’t really regard Palestinian as their “colleagues” in the first place.
TURKEY
The Arab Center’s Salim Çevik tracks the Turkish government’s efforts to rebuild its frayed relations with much of the Middle East:
Since 2021, Turkey has been resetting its policies in the Middle East and has started to reconcile with its rivals in the previous decade—Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, this process has not been linear and in some cases, there have been setbacks or even outright failures. Overall, Turkey’s reconciliation with the UAE stands out not only because of its relative speed, but also because of its potential. Turkish-Emirati ties in certain respects now resemble the long-standing and successful Turkish-Qatari relations, but still fall short of the strategic level of those relations. Turkey’s other attempts at reconciliation are all behind that with the UAE.
LEBANON
Hezbollah said on Thursday that its fighters had launched “dozens” of rockets into northern Israel, in response to a barrage of IDF strikes the previous day. The death toll from Wednesday’s exchange of hostilities has risen to 13, ten civilians and three Hezbollah members including a senior commander in the group’s Redwan special operations unit. The IDF launched retaliatory strikes again on Thursday but I haven’t seen any word as to casualties.
KUWAIT
Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Mishal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah dissolved parliament on Thursday, triggering a snap election. I’m not entirely clear on the details here but it seems a member of the legislature has been accused of insulting the emir, which is against the law, and parliament has refused to delete the offending remarks from the record. This will be Kuwait’s fourth parliamentary election in the past four years, as the ruling family has repeatedly resorted to snap elections in hopes of bringing a less opposition-minded legislature to power. It hasn’t worked so far, but if at first you don’t succeed, etc. The Kuwaiti parliament, unlike its Gulf cousins, actually does have a fair amount of authority so Kuwaiti rulers can’t simply ignore it.
ASIA
PAKISTAN
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party has nominated former Finance Minister Omar Ayub Khan as its PM candidate in the new parliamentary session. PTI has claimed victory in last week’s parliamentary election, but so has the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party. PTI’s candidates won more seats than PMLN’s, but because authorities banned PTI from running as a party its candidates are all technically independents and face major structural challenges in trying to form a government. PMLN has already formed what it says is a governing coalition and this dispute may not be resolved until legislators elect a new PM when the new session of parliament begins. And it might not be settled even then.
In addition to banning the party and other measures the Pakistani establishment took to kneecap PTI’s electoral chances—including imprisoning Imran Khan himself—there are new allegations of outright vote rigging. The “winner” of a parliamentary race in the city of Karachi has refused his seat while claiming that his PTI opponent had thousands of votes simply taken off of his tally in the official results. If it happened in one race it likely happened in others, though it’s impossible to know how widespread this sort of thing might have been.
NORTH KOREA
North Korean state media outlet KCNA reported on Thursday that leader Kim Jong-un had overseen a new test of anti-ship missiles. The South Korean military had said the previous day that it detected the launch of multiple projectiles off of North Korea’s east coast. Unsurprisingly, KCNA characterized the test as successful.
JAPAN
The German economy slid past its Japanese counterpart last year to become the world’s third largest, behind the US and China. Mostly this seems to be the result of Japanese economic struggles, and in particular a steep decline in the value of the yen—the Japanese currency dropped 7 percent against the dollar in 2023 and has declined by about 20 percent total over the past two years. The Japanese economy had apparently slipped into recession by the end of the year.
AFRICA
SENEGAL
The Senegalese Constitutional Council threw a major curveball at President Macky Sall on Thursday, ruling that his decision to postpone the forthcoming presidential election from February 25 until (at least) mid-December was unconstitutional. At least three people have been killed in protests over that postponement, allegedly by Senegalese security forces. At this point it’s unclear what’s going to happen. In theory the ruling means the election should take place as previously scheduled, on February 25. But if Sall is adamant about not holding the vote on that day I’m not sure what the council can do to force him.
Given how elected governments across West Africa have been faring in recent years, Sall may be tempting fate by forcing Senegal into a constitutional crisis. Alex Thurston sees a connection between Sall’s apparent sense of impunity and an international indifference to democratic governance that has helped fuel the region’s recent spate of coups:
The crises in Senegal and within [the Economic Community of West African States] are interrelated in several ways. ECOWAS has been vocal but severely inconsistent in attempting to uphold democratic norms in the region. ECOWAS intervened militarily to oust longtime Gambian President Yahaya Jammeh after he conceded his country’s 2016 elections but then tried to reverse that decision; the intervention represented the high-water mark of ECOWAS’s enforcement power in recent years. Before and after, however, ECOWAS reacted tepidly to relatively blatant power grabs and executive overreach by West African leaders, setting the stage for coups and other forms of upheaval.
Civilian presidents’ overreach included several instances in which legal systems targeted prominent opposition figures at moments that were highly politically convenient for incumbents; for example, in Niger under President Mahamadou Issoufou and in Senegal under Sall. ECOWAS had little criticism to make of those maneuvers, or of dubious third term bids by leaders in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, or of a deeply flawed legislative election in Mali, all of which took place in 2020.
Post-election discontent contributed directly to coups in Mali (2020) and Guinea (2021), suggesting that ECOWAS’s (and Western powers’) reluctance to criticize civilian incumbents can actually feed, rather than tamp down, political instability. ECOWAS’s tolerance of civilian overreach also weakened its credibility when negotiating with coup-makers in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and that same tolerance has also likely been one factor emboldening Sall in his recent decision to postpone Senegal’s elections.
RWANDA
World Politics Review’s Chido Mutangadura explains the recent rise in tensions between Rwanda and Burundi:
In late December, 20 people were killed by a militia in Gatumba, a town in Burundi on the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. An armed group named RED-Tabara has taken credit for the attack, but Burundi ultimately blames Rwanda, accusing Kigali of supporting the militia and labeling Kigali “a bad neighbor.” The rift deepened in January, when Interior Minister Martin Niteretse announced that Burundi would be severing diplomatic ties with Rwanda and closing the border between the two countries. Kigali vehemently denies the charges and accuses Burundi’s government of taking unilateral action.
Though sudden, the escalation of tensions between Burundi and Rwanda just two years after their ostensible reconciliation is unsurprising and can be traced to the conflict in eastern Congo.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Speaking of the eastern Congo, CODECO militia fighters reportedly attacked a gold mine in the eastern DRC’s Ituri province on Wednesday, killing at least 12 people and abducting another 16. Also on Wednesday, at least two South African soldiers were killed when their base in North Kivu province was hit by mortar fire. South African forces are in the eastern DRC to help the Congolese government in its battle with the M23 militia. As far as I know there hasn’t been any indication as to responsibility for the mortar blast.
EUROPE
RUSSIA
The Biden administration said on Thursday that the Russian military is developing an anti-satellite weapon that White House national security spokesperson John Kirby characterized as “troubling,” seemingly confirming reports from the previous day that Moscow might be planning something drastic like putting nuclear weapons in orbit. The exact nature of the weapon is unknown, but while it may be nuclear-powered in some way analysts seem to think it’s “unlikely” that Russia would put actual nuclear warheads in space. Kirby stressed to reporters that there’s no indication the Russians have deployed this weapon and that it does not pose a threat to anyone down here on the ground, except insofar as it could threaten communications networks.
The Russian government has tried to play off this story as a fiction meant to spur passage of a new US military aid package for Ukraine, but Wednesday’s mini-panic has brought new attention to the vulnerability of satellites and the US government’s plans to counter potential threats. According to The New York Times, the plan is to shift from big, expensive communications and intelligence satellites in high orbit to networks of smaller satellites in lower orbit that can serve the same functions, a la Elon Musk’s Starlink service. Smaller satellites can be put in orbit quickly and the network model allows for redundancy, so that if some satellites are destroyed others could pick up the slack.
UKRAINE
The Ukrainian military seems to be on the verge of losing control of the city of Avdiivka, which has been a primary Russian target going back to at least October. Ukrainian officials said on Thursday that they were redeploying several units from the eastern part of Avdiivka to what they called “more advantageous positions,” and the Ukrainian army’s Third Assault Brigade has been sent to the city, possibly to provide cover for a withdrawal. Russian forces have tried repeatedly to encircle Avdiivka but have been unable to fully surround it. Nevertheless, as they did in Bakhmut several months ago the Russians have been able to wear down Ukrainian defenses. Avdiivka is within artillery range of Russian-occupied Donetsk City, so securing it has been a Russian priority for some time.
Elsewhere, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is scheduled to visit Germany and France on Friday to sign bilateral security agreements with the leaders of both of those countries. Zelsnksky has already secured a similar deal with the UK. These agreements are more long-term in nature than arrangements to funnel arms to Ukraine for the current war against Russia, but they’re nevertheless significant at a time when continued military aid from the West—and particularly from the United States—is in doubt.
AMERICAS
VENEZUELA
The Venezuelan government is shutting down a local UN human rights office and gave its staff 72 hours to leave the country on Thursday. This is apparently in response to the UN’s expression earlier this week of “deep concern” over the arrest of Venezuelan activist Rocío San Miguel. Venezuelan authorities took her into custody last Friday, alleging that she’s involved in some sort of US-backed plot to assassinate President Nicolás Maduro.
UNITED STATES
Finally, at Foreign Affairs Stephen Wertheim makes the case for abandoning global primacy as the sine qua non of US foreign policy:
The Biden administration took office intending to inject strategic focus into U.S. foreign policy. The president and his team promised to end the United States’ forever wars and make the country’s international engagements serve the needs of a disaffected public. In its first year, the administration terminated the two-decade-old war in Afghanistan, pledged to “right-size” the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and even pursued a “stable and predictable” relationship with Russia. By placing less emphasis on certain regions, the logic went, Washington could concentrate on what most affects U.S. interests: managing competition with China and tackling transnational threats such as climate change and pandemics.
Today that vision lies in tatters. The United States is now immersed in multiple wars in Europe and the Middle East, precisely where the administration sought to keep things quiet. Meanwhile, relations with China and Russia have deteriorated so strikingly as to raise the realistic prospect of the first major-power conflict since 1945.
One can hardly blame U.S. policymakers for the turmoil. It was Russian President Vladimir Putin who decided to invade Ukraine in 2022, and Hamas that chose to attack Israel in 2023. No one had a crystal ball to predict these shocking actions years in advance. Yet American officials bear responsibility for making a failed wager of their own. They hoped entire regions of the world would sit still because they preferred to turn their gaze elsewhere, even as the United States remained ensconced in those regions’ security arrangements. The Biden administration wanted to prioritize what in its view mattered most while declining to disentangle the United States from what mattered less.
This is a form of wishful thinking—perhaps as naive as invading countries to liberate them—and ought to be recognized as such. The Biden administration is not the first to indulge in it. The rationale for American global dominance after the Cold War, as articulated by the Pentagon in 1992, was that by maintaining military primacy in most world regions, the United States would suppress competition among other countries, dissuade challengers from emerging, and keep the peace at a reasonable cost to Americans. But the unipolar era is over. Going forward, the options are stark: the United States can selectively retrench and control costs and risks, or it can stick with global primacy and lurch from crisis to crisis.