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Happy Hanukkah to those who are celebrating!
THESE DAYS IN HISTORY
December 14, 1911: Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen and his team become the first human beings (that we know of, I suppose) to set foot on the South Pole. The expedition had set out from its base camp on October 19 and arrived back on January 25, 1912.
December 14, 1995: The Dayton Agreement is signed in, you know, Dayton, ending the Bosnian War. Under the terms of the agreement the various warring parties—Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb—agreed not to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina but instead to establish an internal partition between the Serbian Republika Srpska and the Croatian-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has served more or less the same function as if they’d just divided the place up. Worse in some respects, because instead of two functioning states what’s emerged is one state whose two component halves rarely agree on anything and so nothing gets done. Dayton’s terms were intended to end the war and provide a short-term governing solution while the parties negotiated a more durable permanent solution, but instead it’s been the law of the land for 24 years with no real end in sight. It did end the war, though, which to be fair was no minor achievement.
December 15, 1256: Having already received the surrender of the last Assassin imam, Rukn al-Din Khurshah, Mongolian warlord Hulagu and his army enter and destroy the main Assassin fortress at Alamut, completing their campaign against that notorious religious order.
December 15, 1925: Reza Pahlavi is crowned Shah of Iran.
INTERNATIONAL
Worldometer’s coronavirus figures for December 15:
73,790,619 confirmed coronavirus cases worldwide (20,347,075 active, +587,137 since yesterday)
1,640,625 reported fatalities (+12,635 since yesterday)
MIDDLE EAST
TURKEY
1,898,447 confirmed coronavirus cases (+32,102)
16,881 reported fatalities (+235)
Responsible Statecraft’s Nicolas Danforth puts Turkey’s recent intervention in the Caucasus in the context of its broader shift away from its previous “zero problems” approach to foreign policy:
In subsequent years, however, a number of unrelated developments took Turkish foreign policy thinking in a different, darker direction. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the violent return of Turkey’s Kurdish conflict and the 2016 coup attempt all contributed to Ankara’s perception that it was operating in a more hostile environment that called for a more aggressive response.
This perception drove Ankara to undertake a series of military interventions. Turkey has repeatedly launched major-cross border operations to check and then roll back Kurdish gains in Syria. In 2019, Ankara came to the aid of the Government of National Accord in Libya, helping it fend off an attack on Tripoli by forces backed by Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Then, in early 2020, when Russian-backed Syrian government forces attacked the final rebel-held pocket in Idlib, Turkey poured soldiers and armor into the territory in a (partially successful) effort to slow their advance.
These interventions, in turn, created the dynamic of cooperative competition that currently characterizes Turkish-Russian relations. By backing opposing sides in proxy conflicts, then working together to negotiate their resolutions, Moscow and Ankara have both gained influence at the expense of Western actors.
Within this Turkey-Russia dynamic, Danforth argues that Karabakh didn’t really play out the way Ankara wanted. Turkey’s goal in the southern Caucasus was to play the game on Russian turf and perhaps get a leg up in this managed competition for influence. But when Moscow stepped in to impose a settlement, albeit one entirely on Azerbaijani terms, it made sure to lock the Turks out of the process for the most part. Turkey may have gained a bit more influence in the region as a result, but not very much and not really at Russian expense.
IRAQ
577,363 confirmed cases (+1391)
12,614 reported fatalities (+11)
Iraqi activist Salah al-Iraqi was murdered in Baghdad on Tuesday by an unknown masked attacker. He’s the most recent in a long string of anti-government protesters and activists who have been killed by…well, it’s unknown, but most likely by Iraqi militia fighters. The Iraqi government continues not getting to the bottom of these cases despite promises by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi to do so.
Musings on Iraq’s Joel Wing has a post today on the background to recent anti-government protests in Iraqi Kurdistan:
In August the first wave of demonstrations began in the KRG in Sulaymaniya. At their height there were protests in at least five different parts of the province. They started on August 12 in Sulaymaniya city with demands for the regional government to step down and then expanded to cover government salaries not being paid and deteriorating services. Those reached their height on August 22 when government offices were burned and stones were thrown at the local headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Sulaymaniya and Halabja. Demonstrations spread to Irbil the next day leading to 50 arrests and complaints by the Metro Center for Journalists’ Rights and Advocacy and the United Nations that the authorities were using violence against the activists. These highlighted that Kurdistan was in a financial crisis just like the rest of Iraq. That caused the government to not pay its workers for months leading to discontent. At the same time the ruling parties were blamed for their handling of the situation. These two factors would be the driving forces for demonstrations in the next four months.
BAHRAIN
89,444 confirmed cases (+176)
348 reported fatalities (+0)
The US State Department on Tuesday added a relatively obscure Bahraini group called Saraya al-Mukhtar (“the Mukhtar brigades,” probably in reference to 7th century proto-Shiʿa leader named Mukhtar al-Thaqafi) to its “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” list. Explaining the designation, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the group is backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and has “plotted attacks against U.S. personnel in Bahrain and has offered cash rewards for the assassination of Bahraini officials.” Sure, OK. A report from the Congressional Research Service earlier this year found little evidence that the group has been active since 2018.
IRAN
1,123,474 confirmed cases (+7704)
52,670 reported fatalities (+223)
The Iranian government is facing a sustained and broad “international backlash,” as AFP put it, over its execution of journalist Ruhollah Zam over the weekend. Zam, who had been living in France, was apparently abducted while on a trip to Iraq last October and tried over his reporting and activism during anti-government protests in 2017. The Iranian justice system being what it is, we can assume that his prosecution did not meet any reasonable definition of “fair.” The outcry has come not just from the US—the United Nations and several European governments have also criticized Tehran over this affair.
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran appears to be failing, at least where it concerns Iranian oil exports. Several independent analytical outlets have assessed that Iran is exporting substantially more oil now than it was earlier in the year, with those estimates ranging from around 450,000 barrels per day to around 1.2 million bpd. That’s a wide range, to be sure, but in every case the increase represents a doubling, at least, of Iran’s rate of export in the first few months of 2020. Iranian exporters appear to be getting better at evading sanctions, and they’re finding steady customers in Syria, Venezuela, and—most crucially—China.
ASIA
TURKMENISTAN
No acknowledged cases
The Turkmen government continues to insist that there hasn’t been a single COVID-19 case in Turkmenistan. This is even harder to believe than the North Korean government’s zero case claim, and as Eurasianet reports, you don’t have to read too far between the lines to see that it’s a fabrication:
Amsterdam-based Turkmen.news reported on December 11 that parents of children in the Ashgabat and Lebap regions are out of fear refraining from sending their children to school.
“There are about 10 sick children in my niece’s 11th grade class,” a Turkmenabat resident told the website. “A week ago, one girl fell ill right inside the classroom. She began to shake with cold, she couldn’t breathe.”
Even regime-approved outlets are letting the cat out of the bag. Arzuw news website reported on how traditional end-of-year festivities in downtown Ashgabat are being cancelled “due to the epidemiological situation across the world.” Another customary New Year’s Eve party in Ylham park, in front of the circus, has been called off too. An event to mark the passage into 2021 will, however, be held for exactly one hour by the country’s main festive tree, between 11 p.m. and midnight on December 31, and involve a limited circle of up to 50 people, including members of the Cabinet and other important personages. Long-bearded community elders will join that festivity via video link.
State daily newspaper Neutral Turkmenistan on December 11 acknowledged that some health crisis might be afoot by announcing the creation of 24/7 telephone hotline numbers through which anybody suffering from COVID-19-style symptoms – not that the newspaper calls them that – may alert Ashgabat city clinics.
AFGHANISTAN
49,703 confirmed cases (+219)
2001 reported fatalities (+26)
The deputy governor of Kabul and his secretary were killed Tuesday in a “sticky bomb” attack in the Afghan capital, while another such attack killed an official in the Ghor provincial government. Neither attack has been claimed as far as I am aware.
PHILIPPINES
451,839 confirmed cases (+1135)
8812 reported fatalities (+56)
International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said in her office’s annual report, released Monday, that the ICC has “reasonable basis to believe” that Philippine police are committing “crimes against humanity” under the banner of Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drug[ user]s. The ICC is still determining whether to pursue a case against Duterte and may decide in the next few months. Duterte pulled out of the ICC last year, but Bensouda’s office argues that it still has jurisdiction over alleged offenses that occurred while the Philippines was an ICC member.
CHINA
86,758 confirmed cases (+17) on the mainland, 7722 confirmed cases (+98) in Hong Kong
4634 reported fatalities (+0) on the mainland, 123 reported fatalities (+3) in Hong Kong
According to a DC think tank called the Center for Global Policy, the Chinese government has forced some 570,000 minorities in Xinjiang, mostly ethnic Uyghurs, to labor in the region’s massive cotton and garment industry. I mention this mostly because you should probably be aware of it. As far as its veracity is concerned, I have no idea, because this shocking claim is once again being brought to us by everybody’s favorite Xinjiang researcher, Adrian Zenz, whose issues as a source we’ve noted previously.
Elsewhere, a “former mobile network security executive” named Gary Miller is claiming that Chinese government is spying on US mobile phone users via networks in the Caribbean. Miller argues that the US government isn’t doing enough to protect mobile users from the threat of “signalling messages” sent by Chinese operatives to their phones, which can allow those operatives to track the phones and monitor their activity.
OCEANIA
AUSTRALIA
28,048 confirmed cases (+9)
908 reported fatalities (+0)
Australian-Chinese relations are taking another backwards step now that media reports suggest Beijing is banning—though not overtly, at least not yet—Australian coal imports. Australian coal-bearing vessels have reportedly been left stuck outside Chinese ports, waiting possibly in vain to get clearance to offload their cargo. The Australian government could in theory file a complaint against China with the World Trade Organization, though if the ban remains unofficial that might complicate such an effort.
AFRICA
SUDAN
21,864 confirmed cases (+273)
1372 reported fatalities (+17)
Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok lambasted his country’s military establishment on Tuesday for its excessive dabbling in business matters. Allowing that it’s reasonable for a military to invest in defense-related firms, Hamdok went on to say that “it is unacceptable for the military and/or security services to do so in productive sectors, and thus compete with the private sector.” The Sudanese military’s economic reach is vast, and it’s a significant factor complicating the country’s transition from military dictatorship to (in theory) democracy. But in pointing it out, Hamdok risks a backlash from the military at a time when it is still largely in control of that transition process. Hamdok wants to bring companies owned by the military under the control of his civilian government. Military leaders have countered with an offer to give up their tax exemptions but have shown no willingness to go beyond that.
ALGERIA
93,065 confirmed cases (+468)
2623 reported fatalities (+14)
Analyst Giorgio Cafiero suggests that the Israeli-Moroccan normalization agreement that the Trump administration recently brokered may push the Algerian government closer to a couple of US rivals:
Algeria's belief that Arab-Israel normalisation deals and US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara threaten Algerian security will probably result in Algiers moving closer to Russia, and possibly China too.
Moscow responded to Trump's Western Sahara proclamation by claiming that the US is in violation of international law, which will most likely deepen the Algerian-Russian partnership against the backdrop of mounting friction in Algiers-Washington relations.
With President Vladimir Putin at the helm, Russian foreign policy is increasingly focused on growing Moscow's influence in areas of the Middle East and Africa where the Soviet Union had significant clout decades ago. In addition to Syria and southern Yemen, Algeria will probably be another area where we can expect the Russians to become increasingly involved.
GUINEA
13,457 confirmed cases (+0)
80 reported fatalities (+0)
Guinean President Alpha Condé took the oath of office to begin his controversial third term on Tuesday. Condé won Guinea’s October 18 presidential election under contested circumstances. Challenger Cellou Dalein Diallo has maintained that he actually won but for a fraudulent vote count, and that’s secondary to the question of whether Condé, who is constitutionally limited to two terms but insists his term count “reset” to zero due to a constitutional referendum earlier this year, should have been on the ballot at all. Guinean opposition leaders claim that more than 100 people have been killed in election-related violence.
NIGERIA
74,132 confirmed cases (+758)
1200 reported fatalities (+3)
Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of hundreds of students from a secondary school in Nigeria’s Katsina state on Friday. More than 330 students remain missing and presumably in the custody of their kidnappers after that attack. Boko Haram’s claim is…interesting. Certainly Boko Haram has a history of attacking schools and abducting large numbers of students, and the sophistication needed to abduct that many people suggests some level of organization and planning that would be more consistent with an established group than with the “bandit” explanation Nigerian authorities have offered. But Katsina state is in northwestern Nigeria, far afield from Boko Haram’s comfort zone in Borno state, in the country’s northeast. The audio statement in which Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility conspicuously did not go into detail about the attack. And Nigerian authorities say they’re already negotiating with the kidnappers—who were not, according to witnesses, Boko Haram.
There’s no conclusive evidence that Boko Haram wasn’t responsible, but neither is there much evidence that it was. That said, some analysts have speculated that previously disorganized groups of “bandits” in northwestern Nigeria have been collaborating with Boko Haram and/or the Islamic State West Africa Province. That would explain the increasing sophistication of their operations. It is possible the actual kidnappers are working with Boko Haram somehow, or possibly that they delivered the children to Boko Haram for payment, or even that they agreed to let Boko Haram take credit for the attack. On the other hand, maybe Shekau is lying. If Boko Haram has really gained a foothold in northwestern Nigeria, it would be a major development in Nigeria’s ongoing war against jihadist groups.
SOMALIA
4579 confirmed cases (+0)
121 reported fatalities (+0)
The Somali government announced Tuesday that it’s breaking off diplomatic relations with Kenya. Mogadishu expelled Kenya’s ambassador earlier this month, probably over allegations that Nairobi has been interfering in Somali affairs by cultivating a relationship with the president of the autonomous Jubaland region, Ahmed Madobe. Somali officials did not offer any details to explain their decision. Meanwhile, protesters gathered in Mogadishu to demand some progress on plans for a new election. Somalia was supposed to hold a parliamentary election this month but President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and opposition leaders have been unable to agree on the makeup of an elections board and so the vote is currently in limbo.
EUROPE
UKRAINE
909,082 confirmed cases (+8416)
15,480 reported fatalities (+233)
Thousands of protesters angry over COVID-19 lockdown restrictions rallied in Kyiv on Tuesday, after Ukrainian authorities announced a new tightening of those restrictions to run from January 8 to January 24. The demonstrations turned violent when police attempted—unsuccessfully, it seems—to prevent the protesters from setting up tents in central Kyiv’s Maidan Square. Some 40 police officers were reportedly injured.
HUNGARY
285,763 confirmed cases (+1893)
7237 reported fatalities (+107)
In case you were wondering, the Hungarian government continues to be the Hungarian government:
The Hungarian Parliament passed a raft of sweeping measures on Tuesday that curtail the rights of gay citizens and make it more difficult for opposition parties to challenge Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his party in future elections.
The new laws also relax oversight of the spending of public funds, which critics say will allow the government to use state money to benefit loyalists.
The legislation includes a constitutional amendment that critics say lowers the legal threshold for the government to declare a state of emergency, while also removing meaningful oversight of its actions while such a decree is in place.
The same amendment would also effectively bar gay couples from adopting children in Hungary by defining a family as including a man as the father and a woman as the mother. The amendment could also make it harder for single parents to adopt.
In essence, Orbán is now able to declare a state of emergency in response to almost any political upheaval, so something as relatively minor as a protest could give him the pretext to go from mostly authoritarian to fully authoritarian with no check or lever to limit his power. Any remaining pretense of Hungarian democracy can at this point be considered little more than a fig leaf.
AMERICAS
UNITED STATES
17,143,779 confirmed cases (+199,875)
311,068 reported fatalities (+2976)
Finally, World Politics Review’s Edward Alden looks at how new US Trade Representative-designate Katherine Tai will likely fit into the Biden administration’s foreign policy approach:
Under Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class,” the question of how to link trade policy with domestic economic renewal is taking center stage. Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, was part of a team of researchers at the Carnegie Endowment that produced several reports arguing that U.S. foreign policy should be reoriented to address middle-class economic concerns. He also took the lead in drafting Biden’s “Build Back Better” platform, which focuses on investments in American workers and communities. Susan Rice, who served as President Barack Obama’s national security adviser, has been named as head of the White House Domestic Policy Council, further suggesting that the lines between foreign and domestic policy will become especially fuzzy under Biden.
Unlike some past choices for U.S. trade representative, Tai comes with deep trade experience, especially on China, where she used her fluency in Mandarin to lead trade cases for the general counsel’s office at the USTR during the Obama administration. But her most important credential is her work since 2017 as chief trade counsel for the House Ways and Means Committee, where she played a key role in garnering Democratic support for the revised North American Free Trade Agreement—rebranded the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA—by insisting on the toughest labor standards ever included in a trade deal. In one of her rare public appearances last August at the Center for American Progress, she said that in trade policy, “one of the most important lessons is to have robust political support,” both in Congress and among the broader public. Maintaining such support, she argued, will be vital as the U.S. confronts the rising trade challenge from China.
While the details will undoubtedly be different, Alden suggests that in principle, Biden’s approach to trade may resemble Donald Trump’s. Like Trump, Biden may be more concerned than past administrations with how trade deals impact Americans domestically, and less with how they impact US foreign policy goals.