Meet the New Boss, part II
What aspects of Donald Trump's foreign policy might Joe Biden retain? What issues are harder to predict? And what factors might complicate these projections?
This is the second in a two-part series for subscribers about how I envision Joe Biden’s foreign policy playing out. Part I covered some of my general thoughts about this kind of exercise (briefly: it’s educated guesswork and you should treat it as such) and we looked at what Biden is likely to change, for better and for worse. In the conclusion, we’ll look at a few areas where I expect things to more or less stay the same, a few more where I’m not sure, and some potential complications on the horizon.
What’s Likely to Stay the Same
For as often as we’ve been told that Donald Trump is a unique (and uniquely dangerous, depending on your perspective) president, and for as much as that might be true in some ways, in many respects his foreign policy has been very normal. Depressingly normal, even, since “normal” when it comes to US foreign policy isn’t really a good thing. Joe Biden is nothing if not normal, and in that sense he’ll continue what Trump has done. There are also a couple of ways in which Trump did break with precedent in ways that I think Biden will view as “opportunities” on which to build rather than errors that must be corrected.
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2017, Trump’s first year in office, allocated a military budget of just under $620 billion. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 calls for a total military budget of a bit over $740 billion. That’s a nice rate of return in four years, and it’s not changing. I say that not just because Joe Biden has never in almost 50 years as a senator and vice president expressed an interest in cutting defense spending, not just because America almost never cuts defense spending as a rule, and not just because major defense contractors seem decidedly unperturbed about Biden’s victory, but also because Biden has explicitly said he’s not cutting the military budget. He may not raise it by $120 billion or more over his first term, but anyone hoping Biden might reallocate money from this bloated piggy bank to priorities like pandemic recovery or economic recovery is probably delusional.
The Trump administration’s heavy use of sanctions as a tool of coercion and, increasingly, punishment, has been an area of both continuity and change with his predecessors. Trump and his foreign policy team didn’t invent the idea of sanctioning The Bad Guys, and they didn’t invent the idea of inflicting economic pain on a civilian population as a tool for achieving regime change. But they took the use of sanctions much further than any US administration has before—according to the Wall Street Journal, they “imposed sanctions on more than 900 entities or individuals each year for the last four years, nearly 80% more than the annual number of designations imposed by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2016.” They’ve overused sanctions to such an extent that it’s given new impetus to international efforts to find a reserve currency to supplant the dollar, though that’s a whole lot easier said than done.
Understandably, Biden hasn’t gone into any specifics yet about where he might ease Trump’s sanctions or toughen them, or impose new sanctions altogether, although his campaign rhetoric suggests he’ll continue and maybe even escalate US sanctions against Venezuela and so that’s one place I think we can assume will continue to feel their bite. I don’t think his basket of sanctions will look exactly like Trump’s. But sanctions have become so appealing as a way to Get Tough without using kinetic force that I see no reason at this point to think he’ll be any more judicious about their use than Trump has been, despite the potential ramifications.
I’m sort of beating around the bush here, but the key principle of US foreign policy that won’t change, because it never changes, is pretty simple: impunity. The belief, or maybe the truism, that the United States is free to do what it wants to whom it wants whenever it wants is at the core of US foreign policy and has been since the first atomic bomb ever used in combat destroyed Hiroshima. It is embedded in what Biden himself has written about his foreign policy, as Daniel Bessner explained here a few days ago. Biden subscribes to a foreign policy orthodoxy that treats American hegemony as a function of either natural or divine law, unchangeable and foreordained, and that justifies spending unsustainable amounts of money on a mammoth military and using it, as well as other punitive tools like sanctions, to exert American will over the rest of the (subordinate) world. Trump subscribed to that view as well, he just expressed it in a less sophisticated and less obfuscatory way (i.e., “America First”).
In terms of areas in which I think Biden will embrace the Trump administration’s approach none looms larger than China. US policy toward China prior to the Trump administration was inconsistent, with efforts at engagement and attempts at collaboration co-existing with policies like Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” that adopted a “New Cold War” framework with respect to the US-China relationship. Trump discarded the engagement and collaboration and went all-in on the New Cold War. Among many other steps, the Trump administration reduced strategic dialogue with Beijing, amped up engagement with Taiwan, took provocative actions against Chinese media outlets and diplomats in the US, and eventually took the major step of ending Hong Kong’s special status under US law.
After a badly botched and borderline xenophobic initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic that portrayed Trump as insufficiently Tough, the Biden campaign didn’t really have much to say on the subject of China. But while Biden may tinker with the Trump administration’s approach, perhaps restoring some dialogue or easing up on the diplomatic and media restrictions, overall it’s likely he’ll embrace the tension Trump has injected into this relationship and the break it represents with the inconsistent approach I mentioned above. That means continuing to challenge China in the western Pacific, Beijing’s “near abroad,” despite the risk of conflict that entails. It also may undermine the possibility of dialogue with China, which will complicate efforts to cooperatively address critical global issues like climate change and, oh, hey, pandemics. It seems like we’d especially want to cooperate on that one.
What Could Go Either Way
One claim you often see made about Trump’s administration is “at least he didn’t start any new wars.” That this is where we’ve set the bar for US presidencies speaks volumes about the state of US foreign policy, but putting that aside I have a hard time crediting Trump for this because the fact is he went out of his way to provoke at least one war and arguably two, but the other side refused to bite. There was his early term escalation in rhetoric with North Korea, which fortunately ended with a summit (albeit one that didn’t accomplish very much) but could have gone much worse. And there was his four year obsession with punishing and/or provoking Iran, which kicked into high gear with Trump’s decision to light the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) on fire in 2018—subsequently imposing one of the harshest sanctions regimes ever devised on Iran and the Iranian people—and culminated in the assassination of Qasem Soleimani back in January that brought the US and Iran to the brink of a full blown military conflict. It was the Iranians, not Trump, who chose restraint, retaliating with a show of force strike on military targets in Iraq that was intended to minimize casualties.
On the one hand the answer to the question “what will Joe Biden do about Iran?” is deceptively simple, since he’s written openly that he’ll rejoin the JCPOA. But it’s really not that simple. The JCPOA was intended to remain in place for a finite period of time, with the understanding that the US and Iran would build mutual goodwill and continue negotiating on a range of issues bedeviling their relationship. Trump’s election sent the idea of negotiations out the window, and we’re now less than three years from the start of the JCPOA’s phase-out period and less than five years from its termination. Even in Democratic foreign policy circles that support the idea of diplomacy with Iran, there’s now a debate over whether and how to rejoin the JCPOA. At the extreme end the argument is that Biden should use the leverage Trump’s sanctions have supposedly given him to force concessions from the Iranians in exchange for a return to the deal. At the more reasonable end is the position that Biden should perhaps let the Iranians stew for a while, and that he should only return to the JCPOA to use it, as Biden puts it “as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”
All of these debates assume, as foreign policy debates in Washington often do, that the Iranians have no agency in what happens next. But of course they do. The Iranians haven’t succumbed to sanctions yet, and they have no reason to engage in new talks because they now have no reason to believe any agreement the US makes. Iran was supposed to have spent the last five years building up its economy and enjoying freedom from US sanctions—instead, it’s spent them in economic crisis because the US government welched. Iran will hold a presidential election in June in which, thanks to high anti-US sentiment motivating conservatives and high anti-government sentiment depressing turnout among reformers, a conservative is highly likely to win. Biden may struggle, both legally and politically, to untangle the vast web of sanctions the Trump administration has woven over the Iranian economy. And in the meantime, whatever window may now be open for diplomacy will likely be closing fast.
There are several other areas of uncertainty, but for length’s sake I think we’ll just take a brief look at a few of them:
Saudi Arabia/Yemen: During the campaign Biden said some frankly shocking things for a US presidential candidate regarding Saudi Arabia. During the Democratic primary he referred to the kingdom as a “pariah” and suggested he would both cut off US arms sales and try to make the Saudis “accountable” for their malign actions. In particular he’s said he would end US involvement in the Saudi war effort in Yemen. This could be an area where he finds some rare support from Congress, which last year approved a War Powers Resolution that would have ended US involvement in Yemen had Trump not vetoed it. It remains the case that the loss of US support would likely end the Saudi war effort. And long term, Biden’s energy policy could, depending on how it’s conceived, lessen Saudi Arabia’s importance to the United States. I suppose the reason why I’ve put this in the “could go either way” section despite Biden’s unambiguous statements is that, frankly, I just don’t believe him. His anti-Saudi campaign rhetoric strikes me as a purely political attack on Trump, who coddled the Saudis to a greater and more unseemly extent than past presidents, and I just don’t see a US president with foreign policy views as conventional as Biden seriously going after the US-Saudi alliance. Ending the Yemen war would be a massive improvement on its own and I don’t want to diminish that if he does it. But we’ll see. I’m sort of hoping to be proven wrong on this one.
Israel-Palestine: Biden has already said he won’t roll back some of Trump’s most provocative actions with respect to Israel-Palestine, like recognizing Israel’s annexation of the Golan or moving the US embassy to Jerusalem. Lucky for the Palestinians that Israel halted its West Bank annexation plans, I suppose. The Washington Post suggests that Biden’s election means a return to a “traditional” Israel-Palestine policy, which they seem to think was balanced though in reality it was already heavily biased in favor of Israel. Biden’s own record does not suggest someone who will challenge the Israeli government in any serious way on behalf of the Palestinian people. He will probably reverse some of the pettier hardships the Trump administration has senselessly inflicted on the Palestinians—restoring US funding for the UNRWA, something I mentioned in part I, for example. And Biden may not get along well with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a noted Trump acolyte, which could further polarize Israel-Palestine in US politics. But one of the most significant trends in Middle Eastern geopolitics over the past four years, and really before that, has been Arab governments losing interest in the Palestinian cause. I don’t envision Biden doing much to change that.
Drones: Bessner covered this, and it’s sort of baked into my discussion of American impunity above, but I don’t foresee Biden seriously rethinking the assumptions underlying the US drone program apart from maybe reinstituting some fig-leaf “accountability” measures. He may, however, pull back somewhat on the use of drone strikes, which has drastically expanded under Trump after drastically expanding under Barack Obama before him. Fewer drone strikes means fewer people killed in those strikes, which is good even if the attitude that the United States has the right to bomb anyone, anywhere, at any time lingers.
Brexit: I think there’s a pretty good argument to be made that Boris Johnson’s “I don’t care if we negotiate a trade deal” approach to Brexit is partly bluster for the European Union’s benefit but also partly rooted in a belief that Boris’s buddy Donald would come to the UK’s rescue, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, with a swanky trade deal. I’m not sure there was ever a sound basis for Johnson to believe he could rely on Trump in that way, but he certainly shouldn’t expect Biden, a Brexit critic, to bail him out. Biden has made it pretty clear that a US-UK trade deal isn’t going to be a priority for him, and has ruled one out completely if Brexit winds up reimposing a “hard border” between Ireland and Northern Ireland, which is at least possible if not probable. That said, the US-UK relationship is so embedded that I think it’s premature to assume it will drastically change no matter how Brexit plays out.
The Wild Cards
Over these two essays, I’ve looked at areas in which I think Joe Biden is likely to represent an improvement over Donald Trump in terms of US foreign policy, areas in which I think he could be worse, areas in which I think he’ll continue Trump’s approach, and areas in which there’s still a good deal of uncertainty. This is by no means a comprehensive list—like I said in part I, we haven’t even gotten to the unforeseen challenges that will probably define much of Biden’s presidency, as they do for most administrations—and I’ve simplified things quite a bit by necessity. I hope I’ve covered the main points thoroughly enough to give you a sense of where we may be headed. But we should close by noting some of the things that may complicate or bedevil Biden’s foreign policy:
The Lame Duck Period: We can’t talk potential complications without noting that Biden isn’t president yet and won’t be for another ten weeks, give or take. It’s hard to predict how much foreign policy Trump plans on doing over that period—really, it’s hard to predict how much anything he plans on doing. Trump could check out altogether, or focus on his court challenges, or try to do as much as he can to break things and handcuff Biden on his way out the door. Or some combination of the above. If he opts for a scorched earth approach, Trump could, among other things, unleash a whole bunch of new sanctions on Iran to try to wreck the JCPOA once and for all—oh, he’s already going to do that? Well then. He could declare the Houthis a terrorist organization, which would be catastrophic for Yemen. We may also see pressure on wavering Arab countries to cut normalization deals with Israel now, while they can be sure to get maximum benefit. Morocco, which would very much like Trump to recognize its claim on Western Sahara, is one such possibility. There may even be an urgent push in Israel to go ahead with annexing most of the West Bank, though it’s not clear whether domestic Israeli politics will allow for such a sudden and drastic action.
COVID-19 and the Economy: While Biden represents a return to “normalcy” in many ways, the world will not really return to “normal” as long as the pandemic is still raging. But we may have some good news on that front. There’s word just this morning that a new COVID-19 vaccine developed by Pfizer has done very well in stage 3 clinical trials. I wouldn’t start planning any mosh pits just yet, though, and even if the vaccine does work the process of manufacturing and distributing it will take months if not longer, and could go wrong somewhere along the way. Beyond that, it will likely take years for the economic effects of the pandemic to fully materialize and/or dissipate. Already those effects have created instability, sending potentially millions of people into poverty and/or food insecurity and disrupting national finances (especially in energy rich states unequipped to handle current low oil prices). This looms as perhaps the biggest unknown when it comes to predicting what Biden’s foreign policy will look like.
Divided Government: We still don’t know which party will control the US Senate, because there will be runoff elections for both of Georgia’s Senate seats in early January that may determine whether the chamber is majority Republican or split 50-50 (giving incoming Vice President Kamala Harris the tiebreaking vote). The outcome of those elections could determine, for example, the pace of the US (and therefore of the global) economic recovery, and may constrain Biden on foreign policy directly to some degree. Already there’s talk of Biden having to limit his cabinet picks to perceived “moderates” rather than perceived “leftists” in order to get past a Republican Senate—though I think such speculation overestimates Biden’s interest in nominating leftists under any circumstances. Beyond that, to the extent that Biden has made “renewing democracy at home” a key part of his “foreign policy” agenda, the state of American politics would seem to be relevant.
Trumpism: Last but probably not least, there’s the indeterminate fate of “Trumpism,” which admittedly isn’t well defined and particularly so in terms of foreign policy. It seems pretty clear that, whatever “Trumpism” is, though, it will continue to play a role in US politics after a relatively narrow election result. To a large extent “Trumpist” foreign policy has been either blandly conventional or enthralled to Trump’s biggest financial backers, and since those people also happen to be among the Republican Party’s biggest financial backers, they’ll still wield considerable influence over Republican foreign policy. Policy isn’t really the point though. The point is that the effect of Trump and his 2016 election on America’s global image isn’t going away. In short, every other government and international stakeholder in the world now has to reckon with the notion that the United States is perpetually one election away from electing a new Trump (or hell, reelecting the old one if he decides to run again in 2024). Just like Iranian leaders now have no reason to trust any agreement they make with the US, much of the rest of the world may feel a need to start insulating itself from the potential for another 2016 in the future (growing calls to supplant the dollar as the world’s reserve currency are part of this trend). Call it “strategic autonomy” or “adjusting to the decline of American Empire” or whatever you like, it could be a major complication for US foreign policy in the future.
Really insightful. Thanks, Derek!