World roundup: February 20 2024

Stories from Israel-Palestine, Pakistan, Ukraine, and elsewhere

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TODAY IN HISTORY

February 20, 1865: The Uruguayan War, which began as a rebellion by the Colorado Party (aided by Brazil and Argentina) against the Blanco Party-led Uruguayan government (aided by Paraguay), ends with the Blancos’ surrender and the formation of a new Colorado-led government. The results of this relatively short (a bit over six months) conflict were mostly subsumed by the much longer (almost five and half year) and more destructive Paraguayan War (AKA the “War of the Triple Alliance”) that spun out of it. Brazil and Paraguay had already gone to war the previous year, and when the Uruguayan War ended both Argentina and the new Uruguayan government also declared war against Paraguay.

February 20, 1988: Leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave declare independence from Azerbaijan along with their intention to merge the region with Armenia, kicking off a six year war. A relatively low-level conflict in its first couple of years, the war really heated up with the fall of the Soviet Union, when both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states free to conduct their own wars without oversight. The conflict ended in 1994 with an Armenian military victory that established both Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto independence and an Armenian military occupation in surrounding parts of Azerbaijan. A second war in 2020 and a followup operation in 2023 brought all of that territory, including Karabakh, back under Azerbaijani control.

MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

It’s been a few days since we last touched base, but in broad strokes the situation in Gaza has remained static, with Palestinians in Rafah bracing for an eventual Israeli military (IDF) assault amid foundering ceasefire negotiations. Let’s start with the latter, because the main focus on Tuesday was on a new ceasefire push at the United Nations Security Council. The Biden administration has been riding the ceasefire bandwagon for several days now, with Joe Biden himself saying on Friday that “there has to be a temporary ceasefire” to recover Israeli hostages who are still in Gaza. So, naturally, the administration vetoed an Algeria-drafted resolution demanding a ceasefire because it insists, in logic that can only make sense in Washington, that it would undermine efforts to achieve a ceasefire.

The US has put forward an alternative resolution that calls for a temporary ceasefire (at Israel’s earliest convenience) and goes so far as to oppose the forthcoming Rafah assault “under current circumstances.” The text also includes a pro forma denunciation of the October 7 militant attacks in southern Israel that was not in the Algerian resolution and thus provided part of the justification for the US veto. The draft resolution manages to be both very milquetoast and the sharpest international statement the US has made about the Israeli retaliation to date. It’s unclear when the US plans to submit it to a vote, or even whether it plans to do so. If it does advance the resolution to a vote there’s a reasonable chance that Russia and/or China will veto, and it’s possible that’s the outcome the Biden administration is after. It’s also possible that simply circulating the resolution is supposed to pressure the Israeli government to agree to a negotiated ceasefire that would make a vote superfluous.

Elsewhere:

• Part of the reason ceasefire talks are foundering seems to be that the Israeli government has dropped any pretense of negotiating over the release of the remaining hostages and is now simply issuing ultimatums. Israeli “war cabinet” member Benny Gantz over the weekend set the start of the Islamic month of Ramadan—which will be March 10 or 11 this year—as the deadline for Hamas to release the hostages lest the Rafah assault begin in earnest. Since Israeli leaders have said they plan to order the IDF into Rafah eventually no matter what, I’m not entirely sure what this ultimatum is supposed to accomplish. Gantz seemed to indicate that a hostage release would mean some sort of Ramadan pause in IDF operations, but it’s unclear whether he was offering a full ceasefire or just a delay in the ground assault.

• While we’re on the subject of Ramadan, the Israeli government confirmed on Monday that it will restrict Palestinian access to the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in East Jerusalem for the month based on what it deems to be its “security needs.” It’s not yet clear what form restrictions might take, though age and gender restrictions (blocking “military-aged males,” for example) could be involved. Israeli authorities could simply impose ad hoc restrictions as they go. Israeli limitations on access to al-Aqsa generally raise tensions, and under the circumstances this is liable to be a particularly dangerous Ramadan.

• The AP reported on Tuesday that the IDF has ordered new evacuations in parts of Gaza City, where a month and a half ago you may recall it claimed to have “dismantled” militant operations. Apparently the Israelis declared “mission accomplished” prematurely, because Gazan militant groups are once again staging rocket attacks out of Gaza City. There are still tens of thousands of Palestinians trapped in the city and in other parts of northern Gaza with minimal access to humanitarian aid. According to Al Jazeera there is video circulating that shows the IDF firing on civilians waiting to receive what little humanitarian aid has been getting to the city, which has apparently prompted the UN World Food Program to stop food shipments to northern Gaza altogether.

• The IDF has built (or may still be building) a new road just south of Gaza City that will serve in part to cut off northern Gaza from the rest of the territory. This may be the prelude to a permanent depopulation of northern Gaza, opening it either to resettlement by Israelis or to indefinite no-man’s land status. It certainly will help prevent the return of displaced Gazans to northern areas and suggests that the IDF is planning on maintaining a long-term presence in the territory. In theory the gravel road is meant to appear temporary, but “temporary” in this case could mean a period of several years and at any rate the buildings being razed to make way for the road will be gone forever.

• The International Court of Justice is hearing arguments in a new case related to Israel-Palestine, following a UN General Assembly request for an advisory opinion as to whether the Israeli occupation violates international law. The South African government argued at the ICJ on Tuesday that the Israeli government has imposed a system of apartheid on Palestinians, one day after the Palestinians themselves made similar arguments. The Israeli government has rejected the case entirely and isn’t participating, though the US is and will presumably carry most of the water on Israel’s behalf. The ICJ on Friday rejected a South African appeal for another provisional ruling in its genocide case dealing specifically with Rafah, but stressed that when it ordered Israel last month to refrain from genocidal acts that ruling applied as much to Rafah as to the rest of Gaza.

IRAQ

An apparent Turkish airstrike killed at least “two civilians” in northern Iraq’s Dohuk province on Tuesday, according to unspecified “security and health officials” via AFP. There’s been no comment as far as I know from the Turkish government, which regularly attacks Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets in northern Iraq and also regularly kills Iraqi civilians in the process.

LEBANON

The IDF attacked the southern Lebanese town of Ghaziyeh on Monday, wounding at least 14 people. Israeli officials claim they were targeting “two Hezbollah weapons storage facilities” but Lebanese media reported that the airstrikes hit a commercial warehouse. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive. What’s really worrisome about this strike is that Ghaziyeh is located near the city of Sidon, which is some ways north of the border zone where most of the recent IDF-Hezbollah clashing has taken place. Along with a recent surge in the frequency of those clashes this is once again sparking fears of escalation.

YEMEN

Houthi rebels in northern Yemen carried out perhaps their most serious attack on Red Sea shipping to date on Sunday, damaging the cargo vessel Rubymar severely enough that the crew was forced to evacuate and at this point there’s a real risk that the ship could sink. In fact the Houthis are claiming it has already sunk but as far as I know that hasn’t been confirmed. They’ve attacked several other ships over the past couple of days and apparently shot down a US Reaper drone near the Yemeni port city of Hudaydah on Monday. The US military is still carrying out piecemeal strikes against Houthi targets, including a flurry of attacks on Saturday that among other things reportedly hit the Houthis’ first “underwater drone,” but the potential sinking and the drone shoot down may augur another major round of airstrikes in the near future.

ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

The UN held a two day conference on Afghanistan on Sunday and Monday that included “special envoys from 25 countries and regional organizations” according to The New York Times. It did not, however, include any representatives of the Afghan government. The UN apparently invited Afghan officials to send a delegation but they declined, apparently because the conference also included representatives of Afghan civil society groups.

PAKISTAN

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan People’s Party made their coalition agreement official on Tuesday, tapping PMLN founder Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Shehbaz Sharif, as their candidate for prime minister and Asif Ali Zardari, father of PPP boss Bhutto Zardari, as their presidential candidate. They’ve reportedly gotten agreements from four smaller parties and according to Reuters tentatively control 264 seats in the National Assembly—a “comfortable majority,” as Reuters put it.

The rival Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party of former PM Imran Khan, whose candidates collectively “won” the February 8 election but were forced to run as independents and thus face substantial impediments to forming a government, is reportedly trying to surmount those impediments by having its MPs join the small Sunni Ittehad Council party. In theory this could help PTI challenge that tentative majority, but that’s assuming that Pakistani election authorities allow the merger. Since the Pakistani military establishment doesn’t want to see PTI return to power it likely won’t permit this plan to go forward.

MYANMAR

Two people were reportedly crushed to death in a crowd that had gathered outside a passport office in the city of Mandalay on Monday. I mention this because of the strong likelihood of a connection between what seems to be an upsurge in sudden passport requests and the Myanmar junta’s decision last week to start enforcing mandatory military service. If this becomes a trend I would expect the junta to start blocking military aged people from leaving the country.

PHILIPPINES

A clash between Philippine soldiers and Islamic State fighters left at least six soldiers and two militants dead on Monday in Lanao del Norte province. The Philippines’ small Islamic State group, often labeled Dawlah Islamiyah (which means “Islamic State”) to distinguish it from the Islamic State group (with which it is affiliated) has been in the Philippine government’s crosshairs since it carried out a bombing on the campus of Mindanao State University in early December that targeted a Catholic mass and killed four people.

OCEANIA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

A major tribal battle in northern Papua New Guinea’s Enga province left at least 49 people dead on Sunday, with unconfirmed reports putting the death toll at 64 and possibly higher. A land dispute involving members of the Ambulin and Sikin tribes appears to have been the cause. Tribes in that area clash with some regularity but the influx of more advanced firearms (AK-47s, M-4s, etc.) has made those conflicts more acutely dangerous. Papua New Guinean authorities have talked about cracking down on arms smugglers but it’s unclear whether they’re actually able to do so.

AFRICA

SUDAN

Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping are having a presumably unintended consequence on humanitarian relief efforts in Sudan. According to The Guardian, aid shipments that previously would have sailed into the Red Sea from the south are now being diverted through alternative routes that are longer and costlier. Aid organizations were already struggling to meet the critical need in Sudan thanks to a combination of low funding and logistical challenges created by the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces group. These diversions are just adding to those challenges.

SENEGAL

Senegalese President Macky Sall has apparently blinked, after the country’s Constitutional Council ruled on Thursday that his decision to postpone the February 25 presidential election was unconstitutional. Sall responded on Friday by declaring his intention to abide by the council’s ruling and its demand that the vote be held “as soon as possible” (February 25 now being impossible from a logistical standpoint). He hasn’t offered a new date yet, but his term legally ends on April 2 so in theory it should be sometime before that.

On Saturday, thousands of people took to the streets of Dakar for what was the first organized, authorized protest against the election delay since Sall announced it earlier this month. Coming after the council ruling and Sall’s apparent reversal, the demonstration served to maintain pressure on Sall to abide by his new commitment.

A scene from Saturday’s demonstration in Dakar (Cem Ozdel/Anadolu via Getty Images)

GUINEA

Guinea’s ruling junta announced late on Monday that it has dissolved the country’s interim government, which has been in place since July 2022. As far as I know the junta has not yet explained its decision, nor is there any indication how much turnover might be expected in the next government, whenever one is appointed. Also unclear is what effect this move will have on Guinea’s theoretical transition back to civilian governance, which junta leader Mamady Doumbouya has previously said would be completed by the end of this year.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Allied Democratic Forces militants have killed at least 24 people in attacks on two villages over the past two days. ADF fighters killed at least 11 people in one raid in North Kivu province on Monday and at least 13 people in a similar assault in Ituri province on Tuesday. Those death tolls may rise as authorities assess the aftermath. On Sunday, fighters from the ethnically Lendu CODECO militia killed at least 15 people, apparently members of the rival Hema community, in Ituri province.

On Tuesday, the UN Security Council voted to sanction six militants operating in the eastern DRC, including two ADF leaders. Also blacklisted were a spokesperson for the Rwanda-supported M23 militia, a leader of the Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda group, and one leader each from the Twirwaneho and the National People’s Coalition for the Sovereignty of Congo militias.

EUROPE

RUSSIA

Imprisoned Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny died on Friday in the Arctic penal colony to which he’d been transferred in December. According to Russian officials he felt “unwell” after a walk on Friday and passed away of what they termed “sudden death syndrome.” Western governments and Navalny’s family are unsurprisingly blaming the Russian government for his death, and I think whether Vladimir Putin expressly ordered his killing on Friday or his death was just the cumulative effect of his imprisonment—perhaps compounded by the lingering effects of his 2020 Novichok poisoning—there is plenty of reason to lay responsibility at the Russian government’s doorstep.

On a related note, a Russian helicopter pilot who’d defected to Ukraine last year, Maksim Kuzminov, also passed away of sudden death syndrome last week right after somebody shot him a few times and ran over him with a car in Spain. Kuzminov’s identity was confirmed by Ukrainian officials on Tuesday. I don’t think there’s much mystery about who killed him, though Spanish and European Union authorities might want to investigate how they were able to do it.

UKRAINE

After months of pressure, the Russian military finally seized control of the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka after the Ukrainian military withdrew on Saturday to avoid potential encirclement. Russian forces cleared out one last pocket of Ukrainian resistance at Avdiivka’s coke plant on Monday, solidifying their gain. This is the biggest territorial advance for the Russians since their capture of Bakhmut last year and probably has more strategic significance, at least insofar as it pushes Ukrainian artillery out of range of the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk. Russian officials have suggested that the Ukrainians retreated hastily and in poor order, though Ukrainian officials insist they conducted an orderly withdrawal and have redeployed their forces to new defensive positions nearby.

On Tuesday, the Russian military claimed that its forces had recaptured a Ukrainian “bridgehead” on the eastern side of the Dnipro River in Kherson oblast. There’s no confirmation of that. The Ukrainian military has been trying to establish a durable presence on the eastern side of the Dnipro for several months, hoping to use it to open a new front in the war, but it hasn’t been able to advance beyond the riverbank.

Meanwhile, according to NBC News the Biden administration has decided to start supplying Ukraine with the longer-range variant of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It’s already sending older and shorter-range ATACMS units to Kyiv but has been hesitant to send the more advanced versions. Of course, it won’t be able to send any version of the ATACMS to Ukraine if the US House of Representatives doesn’t approve new Ukrainian military funding.

SWEDEN

Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party has called for a parliamentary vote on Monday on Sweden’s NATO accession, which presumably means that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is finally ready to allow it to pass. Hungary is the only NATO member that hasn’t yet ratified Swedish membership. It’s never been entirely clear what Orbán wanted to get out of delaying ratification and it’s not clear now why he’s apparently decided to drop his opposition. His most recent demand was for Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to visit Budapest to iron out Hungary’s unspecified concerns, and Kristersson has apparently agreed to stop by on Friday for a chat. I guess if that visit goes badly Monday’s vote could be canceled, but at this point that seems unlikely.

AMERICAS

BRAZIL

The Brazilian government on Monday recalled its ambassador from Israel, after the Israeli government declared Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva persona non grata. On Sunday, Lula compared the Israeli military operation in Gaza to the Holocaust in remarks to reporters in Ethiopia, prompting an angry response from Israeli leaders and the PNG designation. Lula has refused to backtrack despite some international and domestic criticism.

ECUADOR

The Ecuadorian government has decided not to move forward with a plan to send its older Soviet-era military hardware to Ukraine in return for swanky new military hardware from the US. You may recall that the Russian government earlier this month started banning the importation of Ecuadorian bananas in response to that plan, a move that has caused banana shortages in Russia but also threatens hundreds of millions of dollars in export revenue for the Ecuadorian economy. Moscow has now apparently lifted the embargo.

EL SALVADOR

A hand count of votes cast in this month’s Salvadoran election give President Nayib Bukele’s New Ideas party 54 of the 60 seats in the Salvadoran Congress, according to election officials. Bukele on election night claimed that his party had won 58 seats, but the hand count—ordered after a number of irregularities were discovered in the automated vote count—told a slightly different story. Fear not, however, because at 54 seats Bukele still has the ability to govern essentially by decree and to change or ignore the Salvadoran Constitution at will. Opposition parties are demanding that the entire election result be tossed out over those aforementioned irregularities, but suffice to say that is the longest of shots.

UNITED STATES

Finally, at FOREVER WARS Spencer Ackerman highlights a largely ignored piece of the US government’s retaliation against Iranian regional interests earlier this month, and the risk it entails:

In addition to bombing Kataib Hezbollah, the Houthis and other "Axis of Resistance" components in Iraq, Syria and Yemen two weekends ago, the U.S. also executed a cyberattack against the Behshad, an Iranian cargo ship in the Red Sea, operating off the coast of Djibouti. NBC, which broke the story of the cyberattack, reported that U.S. intelligence believes the Behshad was transferring intelligence on Red Sea traffic to the Houthis, who have been harassing shipping in the crucial waterway to pressure Israel to stop annihilating Gaza. Neither NBC nor a short catch-up item from the Times provided much more detail than that, although NBC noted a public warning delivered by the Iranians to the U.S. against targeting the ship before the U.S. targeted the ship. Voice of America said it had confirmed a cyberattack on a second ship, an unnamed frigate, as well.

When the U.S. didn't hit Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets two weekends ago, it struck me that the Biden administration was leaving itself room to escalate against the likely reprisal to come, while stepping back from the brink of all the pressure to hit Iran directly. But apparently not. A cyberattack against the Behshad is a "greyzone" style of attack, intended to inflict damage on an adversary below his threshold for retaliation.

When you inflict an attack like this, you smirkingly presume the other guy will understand that he's bested and back down. When you experience an attack like this, you intuitively understand it as a risible provocation that demands satisfaction. It's easy to imagine the Biden administration reconciling attacking the Behshad with its insistence it seeks no escalation. It's just as easy to imagine the Iranians fearing the U.S.' digital weaponry has penetrated Iran's naval infrastructure crucial not just for intelligence transmission but navigation and command-and-control. Neither combatant knows where the ledge is, but both are incentivized to get his toes closer to it, each hoping the other guy will be the one who falls.

As Spencer writes, it sure does seem like a good time to open some kind of negotiation with Tehran in the name of deescalation, but there’s no reason at all to believe the Biden administration is considering that.